The Tort of Criminal Conversation in Nebraska: \u3ci\u3eKremer v. Black\u3c/i\u3e, 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W.2d 582 (1978) by Schneider, Donald D.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 2 Article 10
1978
The Tort of Criminal Conversation in Nebraska:
Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W.2d 582
(1978)
Donald D. Schneider
University of Nebraska College of Law, donschneiderlaw@yahoo.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Donald D. Schneider, The Tort of Criminal Conversation in Nebraska: Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W.2d 582 (1978), 58 Neb. L.
Rev. 595 (1979)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol58/iss2/10
Note
The Tort of Criminal Conversation
in Nebraska
Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W.2d 582 (1978).
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, criminal conversation was a husband's tort action
against a man who had engaged in sexual intercourse with the hus-
band's wife. Thewife was not a party to the suit. It was considered
the civil remedy for the crime of adultery,' although conviction of
the crime was not necessary to recovery for the tort. It is a cause
of action distinct from the other torts involving intentional interfer-
ence with family relations. 2 The original basis of the tort was the
1. Oliver v. Oliver, 159 Neb. 218, 225, 66 N.W.2d 420, 424 (1954). The most com-
plete history is found in Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 CoL.u.
L. REV. 651 (1930). One author, relying upon Lippman, wrote:
The earliest origins of tort law dealing with interference with fam-
ily relations and particularly the tort of criminal conversation, may
date back as far as the ancient Teutons who took such a harsh view
of adultery that their social customs permitted a husband to kill or
castrate his wife's lover if he came upon them in flagrante delicto;
this later evolved into a right in the husband to abandon his spouse
to the lover and demand monetary compensation as well as a new
wife.... With the advent of Christianity and its disapproval of di-
vorce, the husband's rights vis a vis the martial [sic] interloper be-
came simply the entitlement to monetary damages.
Note, The Tort of Criminal Conversation is Abolished in Pennsylvania, 22
VnL L REv. 1253, 1253-54 n.5 (1977) (citations omitted).
2. Alienation of affection and enticement are two other torts involving inten-
tional interference with the family relationship. Alienation of affection in-
volves purposely depriving one spouse of the aid, comfort, assistance, and
society of the other. Oliver v. Oliver, 159 Neb. 218, 66 N.W.2d 420 (1954). En-
ticement consists of a third person purposely inducing a married person to
separate from and leave his or her spouse. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS
§ 684 (1977). Enticement, alienation of affection, and criminal conversation
are separate torts, and may exist independent of each other. Despite the dis-
tinctions drawn by courts, Prosser states there is "no good reason" to distin-
guish the three torts, since each involves an interference with the same
relational interest, i.e., marriage. W. PROSSER, ToRTS § 124 at 876 (4th ed.
1971). However, a significant practical difference is that alienation of affection
and enticement are intentional torts requiring a showing of intent and causa-
tion; intent would include knowledge that the person was married. RESTATE-
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property interest of the husband in his wife,3 but eventually it was
perceived that the cause of action was grounded in a right of con-
sortium.4 Under modern law a wife has the same standing to bring
suit for criminal conversation as a husband.5
Criminal conversation has assumed the character of a strict lia-
bility tort. Plaintiff need only show marriage and an act of sexual
intercourse performed without the consent of the plaintiff. De-
fendant cannot assert lack of intent, or lack of knowledge that the
person was married.6 Once the prima facie case is established
general damages are presumed, although evidence such as the
spouse's prior unfaithfulness and aggressiveness or the plaintiff's
own unchaste character or cruelty can be introduced to mitigate
damages.7 In Nebraska the cause of action for criminal conversa-
tion has been routinely upheld for over seventy-eight years,8 al-
though elsewhere it has been under increasing attack as an
anachronism riddled with abuse and injustice.9 In the recent case
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683, Comments g, i at 480-81; § 684, Comments f-g
at 483-84 (1977). Criminal conversation does not require such a showing. See
notes 6-7 & accompanying text infra.
3. Lippman, supra note 1, at 655-56.
4. Id. at 651-52. The term consortium is widely used, but is without a precise
meaning.
Nature of marital interests. The legally protected marital interests
of one spouse include the affections, society and companionship of
the other spouse, sexual relations and the exclusive enjoyment of
them, services in the home and support.
The word "consortium" is frequently employed in judicial opin-
ions to indicate any or all of those interests of the husband or wife in
the marriage relation that receive legal protection by rules of law.
The word is therefore ambiguous and is not used in this Restate-
ment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683, Comment c at 478 (1977).
5. White v. Longo, 190 Neb. 703,212 N.W.2d 84 (1973); Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa.
13, 156 A.2d 537 (1959).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 685, Comments d, f-g at 485-86 (1977).
7. Comment, Criminal Conversation: Civil Action for Adultery, 25 BAYLOR L.
REv. 495, 497 (1973).
8. Breiner v. Olson, 195 Neb. 120, 237 N.W.2d 118 (1975); White v. Longo, 190 Neb.
703, 212 N.W.2d 84 (1973); Oliver v. Oliver, 159 Neb. 218, 66 N.W.2d 420 (1954);
Klinginsmith v. Allen, 155 Neb. 674,53 N.W.2d 77 (1952); Cantin v. Howard, 131
Neb. 192, 267 N.W. 423 (1936); Baker v. Westing, 102 Neb. 840, 170 N.W. 168
(1918); Wheeler v. Abbott, 89 Neb. 455, 131 N.W. 942 (1911); Smith v. Meyers,
52 Neb. 70, 71 N.W. 1006 (1897).
9. See Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976); Comment, supra note
7; Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33 MICH. L. REv. 979 (1935).
Prosser has written:
Those actions for interference with domestic relations which carry
an accusation of sexual misbehavior-that is to say, criminal conver-
sation, seduction, and to some extent alienation of affections-have
been peculiarly susceptible to abuse. Together with the action for
breach of promise to marry, it is notorious that they have afforded a
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of Kremer v. Black'o the Nebraska Supreme Court again affirmed
the cause of action for criminal conversation without modification,
but only over a vigorous dissent which charged that the traditional
rules governing this tort need to be changed."
This note will discuss the Kremer decision. Although it may
have been appropriate for the court to preserve a cause of action
for criminal conversation in Nebraska,12 the majority deferred to
the legislature and failed to address or rebut the significant criti-
cism of certain traditional rules governing the cause of action.13
Not discussed in either opinion was the recently enacted Nebraska
Criminal Code, which reflects important changes in public policy
regarding family and sexual matters and which, while recognizing
the important social interest involved, arguably supports modifica-
tions in the cause of action for criminal conversation.' 4 While
criminal conversation has been challenged as a violation of a con-
stitutionally protected right to privacy,' 5 and as a violation of the
fertile field for blackmail and extortion by means of manufactured
suits in which the threat of publicity is used to force a settlement.
There is good reason to believe that even genuine actions of this type
are brought more frequently than not with purely mercenary or vin-
dictive motives; that it is impossible to compensate for such damage
with what has derisively been called "heart balm;" that people of any
decent instincts do not bring an action which merely adds to the fam-
ily disgrace; and that no preventive purpose is served, since such
torts seldom are committed with deliberate plan. Added to this is
perhaps an increasing notion of personal or even sexual freedom on
the part of women, and the feeling, illustrated by the current attitude
toward divorce, that a home so easily broken up is not worth main-
taining.
W. PnosSER, supra note 2, at 887 (footnotes omitted). Many of Prosser's criti-
cisms are challenged or rebutted in Note, The Case for Retention of Causes of
Action for Intentional Interference With the Marital Relationship, 48 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 426 (1972).
10. 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W.2d 582 (1978).
11. Id. at 473-79, 268 N.W.2d at 585-88 (McCown, J., dissenting).
12. See notes 53-57 & accompanying text infra; note 76 & accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 37-52 & accompanying text infra.
14. See notes.58-75 & accompanying text infra.
15. For a discussion of this issue, which was suggested in a concurring opinion in
Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 283-84, 365 A.2d 147, 152-53 (1976) (Manderino,
J., concurring), see Note, supra note 1, at 1262-64. The author found little sup-
port for the proposition that a right of privacy included the right to commit
adultery. Although Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), held
that a state cannot condition an abortion in the first trimester upon the hus-
band's consent, the Court noted in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49
(1973): "Our Constitution establishes a broad range of conditions on the exer-
cise of power by the States, but for us to say that our Constitution incorpo-
rates the proposition that conduct involving consenting adults only is always
beyond state regulation, is a step we are unable to take." Id. at 68 (footnotes
omitted).
Another weakness of this approach is that the right to privacy is grounded
1979]
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equal protection clause,16 these arguments will not be discussed in
this note.
11. FACTS
The plaintiff was married on February 14, 1976. Both she and
her husband had children from prior marriages. They had met
about a year earlier, had shortly thereafter begun living together,
and had engaged in a continuing sexual relationship prior to the
marriage. The evidence indicated that in early 1976, plaintiff had
given an ultimatum to either agree to marriage by mid-February or
move out. Both their premarital and marital relationships were
stormy at best, with frequent arguments and short separations fol-
lowed by reconciliation.' 7 Six months after their marriage, follow-
ing the second major fight within a matter of days, the husband
chose to leave and was told by plaintiff that if he did so he was
never to come back. He left, subsequently instituting a petition for
dissolution of marriage on August 16, 1976.18
Defendant had met plaintiff's husband five years earlier at a
business lunch that defendant attended with her father, and had
renewed the aquaintance at a similar business lunch in January
1976, before he and plaintiff were married. They met again at a
business meeting in May or June, but apparently had never dated
or been alone prior to July 20, the date plaintiff's husband had left
her.19
Plaintiffs husband temporarily moved in with a male friend. At
a meeting with defendant in early August, he advised her that he
was securing a dissolution of his marriage.20 Prior to filing the pe-
in the fourteenth amendment, and the cases expounding it have involved im-
permissible state interference with this right. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). Criminal conversation involves a private cause of action and
unless providing a forum for the adjudication of private grievances consti-
tutes sufficient "state action," it does not come within the ambit of the four-
teenth amendment There seems to be little support for such an extension of
the "state action" concept. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HAND-
BOOK ON CONsnTTrrTONAL LAw 462 (1978).
16. In dictum the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggested that the action for
criminal conversation might be a denial of equal protection in that only one of
two persons engaged in the same act was liable to the plaintiff. Fadgen v.
Lenkner, 469 Pa. at 280-81 n.7, 365 A.2d at 151 n.7. Equal protection also comes
within the ambit of the fourteenth amendment, and concerns impermissible
state action. See note 15 supra.
17. 201 Neb. at 468-69, 268 N.W.2d at 583.
18. Id. at 468-69, 268 N.W.2d at 583; Brief for Appellant at 6-21.
19. 201 Neb. at 468, 268 N.W.2d at 583; Brief for Appellant at 6-21.
20. Although it was clear that defendant was aware of his marital situation, there
was disputed testimony regarding the nature of his representations to her.
Defendant's brief states: "She had been advised. . . that Mr. Kremer was
securing a dissolution of marriage .... ." Brief for Appellant at 11 (emphasis
[VOL. 58:595
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tition for dissolution of marriage on August 16, he moved in with
defendant. It was admitted by defendant that they engaged in sex-
ual relations.2' The dissolution of marriage decree for plaintiff and
her husband was entered by the district court on March 1, 1977.22
Plaintiff brought suit in the District Court for Douglas County
on November 3, 1976, alleging causes of action for alienation of af-
fection and criminal conversation.23 The jury found for defendant
on the first count, which was not appealed. The jury returned a
verdict for plaintiff on the second count and assessed $10,000 dam-
ages. Following denial of motion for new trial, defendant appealed
to the Nebraska Supreme Court.24
111. DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
The first assignment of error was that the trial court failed to
instruct the jury that malice, intent, and causation are elements
that must be proved to sustain a recovery for criminal conversa-
tion.25 The Supreme Court reasoned that defendant's argument
was in effect an attack on the existence of a common law cause of
action for criminal conversation, and was a plea for its abolition by
the court.2 6 Noting that "[t]he sexual relation of marriage is one
added). Plaintiff's brief contends she was informed, "rather that he was go-
ing to do so ... ." Brief for Appellee at 6 (emphasis added).
21. 201 Neb. at 469, 268 N.W.2d at 583.
22. Id.
23. Brief for Appellant at 6. See note 2 supra.
24. 201 Neb. at 468-69, 268 N.W.2d at 583-84.
25. 201 Neb. at 469, 268 N.W.2d at 583. The court noted. 'he defendant concedes
that these are not elements of the action, and cites no authority to support
this precise contention." Id. See notes 6-7 & accompanying text supra. De-
fendant alleged that due to the presumption of damages, jury awards result
from emotional and moral indignation and tend to be punitive in nature
rather than reflecting actual pecuniary loss. Under traditional tort theory,
malice and intent must be established in order to recover punitive damages.
W. PuossEP, supra note 2, § 2, at 9-10. Apparently defendant reasoned that
since criminal conversation awards are punitive in nature, plaintiff should
have this additional burden. This argument seems particularly weak since
Nebraska does not allow punitive damages. Wilfong v. Omaha & Council
Bluffs St. P Co., 129 Neb. 600,262 N.W. 537 (1935); Boyer v. Barr, 8 Neb. 68, 74-
75 (1878).
Others have suggested that intent or causation should be elements of an
action for criminal conversation. See Note, supra note 9. However, the at-
tempt to require proof of malice as a necessary element of plaintiff's case is a
novel approach, and is without support from the cases or commentators. The
Iowa Supreme Court has held that legal malice, which is necessary for puni-
tive awards in Iowa, is presumed in an action for criminal conversation.
Giltner v. Stark, 219 N.W.2d 700, 708 (Ia. 1974).
26. 'The defendant, in effect, asks this court to judicially legislate the cause of
19791
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that must be maintained inviolate for the well-being of society,"27
the court cited secondary authority to establish that engaging in
sexual intercourse with a married person is a tortious invasion of
the other spouse's rights.28 It refused to abolish the action for
criminal conversation "as it presently exists, '2 9 stating that such a
decision is for the legislature, since it involves a social policy-mak-
ing area.3°
Defendant also contended that a new trial should be granted
because of the excessiveness of the award. She cited a prior Ne-
braska case, Breiner v. Olson,3 ' which stated: "Jury verdicts...
[in a criminal conversation action] should be set aside.., as ex-
cessive only where it clearly appears that the award was the result
of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury."3 2 However, the
court observed that Breiner involved facts similar to the case at
bar, and in it a $25,000 award was upheld3 3 It apparently did not
find it significant that Breiner involved a marriage that had lasted
ten years and had produced four children, with substantial evi-
dence that defendant, who was plaintiff's employer, had engaged
in adulterous relations with plaintiff's spouse for nearly two years.
In addition, defendant fired plaintiff after being caught with plain-
tiff's wife, refusing to pay him back wages that were owed.34
In Kremer, the court noted that plaintiff's marriage had lasted
several months; that there had been extended periods of harmony;
that despite certain difficulties the couple had always reconciled
their disputes; that plaintiff had attempted to convince her hus-
band to return home; and that the criminal conversation occurred
before the petition for dissolution of marriage was ffied.35 The
court then cited the Nebraska rule governing damages in a crimi-
nal conversation action: "Courts will seldom interfere with the
action for criminal conversation out of existence." 201 Neb. at 471, 268 N.W.2d
at 584. The majority opinion did not consider whether the court could retain
the cause of action while allowing modification of the traditional rules.
27. Id. at 470, 268 N.W.2d at 584.
28. The citation was to 41 AM. Jum. Husband and Wife § 476, at 402 (1968).
29. 201 Neb. at 470, 268 N.W.2d at 584.
30. "Defendant, in effect, calls on this court to define and strike the balance on
the volatile moral issues involved. Even a minimum of judicial restraint
would indicate that the Legislature is the proper forum for relief, if such relief
is advisable." Id. at 471, 268 N.W.2d at 584. For an analysis of the failure of
legislatures generally to respond to such invitations, see note 49 infra.
31. 195 Neb. 120, 237 N.W.2d 118 (1975).
32. Id. at 131, 237 N.W.2d at 126.
33. The court noted the following similarities: "proof of only one act of inter-
course, and no direct evidence of pecuniary damage, and as here, the jury
returned a verdict for the defendant in the accompanying action for aliena-
tion of affection." 201 Neb. at 472, 268 N.W.2d at 585.
34. 195 Neb. at 122-24, 237 N.W.2d at 122-23
35. 201 Neb. at 468-69, 268 N.W.2d at 583.
[VOL. 58:595
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finding of the jury in such actions, for the reason that there is no
method of determining exactly the proper pecuniary compensation
which should be awarded."36 Under these facts the jury verdict ap-
parently could not be found excessive, and the judgment was af-
firmed.
B. Dissenting Opinion
Although the dissent did not seek abolition of the cause of
action for criminal conversation, it did propose significant modifi-
cations in the traditional rules governing the tort. The customary
lack of defenses was severely criticized.37
A cause of action for criminal conversation ought to be treated in the
same fashion as the other common law causes of action for intentional
interference with the marital relationship. An intention to interfere with a
marital relationship should not be presumed where the defendant does
not know, or have reason to know, that the other individual is married, or
has been actively misled into believing the other individual was unmar-
ried. Such facts should constitute a complete defense to an action for the
intentional tort of criminal conversation.38
The conventional presumption of general damages upon the
mere showing of a valid marriage and a single act of sexual inter-
course 39 was also criticized. Justice McCown noted that in the
other common law torts for interference with the marital relation a
defendant generally cannot be held liable for damages where the
acts complained of occur after a complete or permanent breach of
the marriage, such as separation.4°
36. 201 Neb. at 473, 268 N.W.2d at 585. Other courts have limited the recovery
under criminal conversation through more liberal approaches to review of
damage awards. In Roach v. Keane, 73 Wis. 2d 524, 243 N.W.2d 508 (1976), a
total award of $30,000 was reduced to $5,100, on the grounds that plaintiff's
extramarital affairs and abuse of his wife throughout the marriage indicated
his low estimation of the value of the marriage. Both the punitive portion and
the compensatory portion were reduced. Id. at 538-42, 243 N.W.2d at 516-18.
37. The dissent quoted a Pennsylvania case to show the severity of the no-de-
fense rule: "A man who has sexual relations with a woman, not his wife, as-
sumes the risk that she is married. Even her misrepresentation that she is
single affords the offender no defense to liability for criminal conversation."
201 Neb. at 474-75, 268 N.W.2d at 586 (McCown, J., dissenting) (quoting Anto-
nelli v. Xenakis, 363 Pa. 375, 378, 69 A.2d 102, 103 (1949)).
38. 201 Neb. at 475-76, 268 N.W.2d at 586. For discussion of the other torts involv-
ing intentional interference with the family relationship, and their require-
ment of a showing of knowledge and intent, see note 2 .supra. Of course it is
not entirely certain that Justice McCown's proposal to allow the defense of
ignorance concerning the marital state of one's sexual partner would have
helped defendant, given her general knowledge of the marriage. Had Justice
McCown prevailed it would have been necessary to remand to allow a jury to
decide this issue under the new rule.
39. See notes 6-7 & accompanying text supra.
40. 201 Neb. at 476-77, 268 N.W.2d at 586-87.
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Meanwhile juries in criminal conversation cases continue to return very
large verdicts reflecting exemplary and punitive awards. It should be the
rule that when the conduct which forms the basis for an action for crimi-
nal conversation occurs after a permanent separation of the plaintiff and
his or her spouse, and a decree of divorce follows, damages for criminal
conversation, at most, should be restricted to nominal damages, in the ab-
sence of proof of special damages.
4 1
The dissent also attacked the majority opinion for holding that
only the legislature could change or abolish the cause of action for
criminal conversation. Justice McCown noted that the tort was of
judicial origin, and that the rules governing it were court-made
rules. He cited a prior Nebraska case holding that the supreme
court could modify the common law as necessary to keep its princi-
ples relevant,42 and another case in which the court had specifi-
cally altered the rights of the parties in a cause of action arising in
tort.43 Arguing that .under the traditional rules criminal conversa-
tion has become an anachronism, he added. "[Ilt's injustices
should not be continued . . .simply because our previous deci-
sions have followed the traditional rules for a very long time. Jus-
tice should not be so readily sacrificed on the altar of stare
decisis."44 He concluded that the verdict was punitive, directed to-
ward the wrong person, and should be reduced to a nominal
amount.
45
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Altering the Rules
One defect in the majority opinion is its failure to address
whether the court could have retained a cause of action for crimi-
41. Id. The dissent then stressed the shortness and sexual casualness of the
marriage, and that the couple had permanently separated before the begin-
ning of the relationship between plaintiff's husband and defendant. How-
ever, the dissent seems to be assuming after the fact that indeed the couple
had permanently separated. The majority opinion reasoned that a jury could
reasonably conclude that "but for" the acts of defendant, the couple might
have reconciled. The court noted: "[T] he evidence supports the conclusion
that during the whole period of the marriage and the courtship ... the plain-
tiff and Kremer had numerous difficulties and fights, and temporary separa-
tions, but would become reconciled and continue their relationship." Id. at
469, 268 N.W.2d at 583 (emphasis added). Thus, the proposed rule on dam-
ages would also have required a remand for a jury determination of whether
the separation was in fact permanent at the time the act of criminal conversa-
tion occurred.
42. Johnson v. Tautges, Rerat & Welch, 146 Neb. 439, 445-50, 20 N.W.2d 232, 235-37
(1945) (altering personal jurisdiction and service of process rules).
43. Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430,434-35, 160 N.W.2d 805, 808 (1968) (limit-
ing governmental immunity from tort liability).
44. 201 Neb. at 479, 268 N.W.2d at 588.
45. Id.
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nal conversation while modifying the existing rules.46 It would
seem that the court could have made such changes had it chosen
to do so. Although no precedent from other jurisdictions exists for
modifying the criminal conversation rules, such a result has been
urged.47 Neither opinion in Kremer discussed whether the modifi-
cations suggested by Justice McCown would so alter the character
of the traditional cause of action that it would be abolished except
in name.4
The argument that only the legislature should make such
changes seems particularly weak, since it would seem that the
courts are far better suited to such a tasl 49 It is undisputed that
46. It would appear that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made the same as-
sumption in the recent case of Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147
(1976), although with the opposite result. The court examined the common
law origins and development of the tort and decided that the rationale under-
lying denial of any defense except consent of plaintiff is unacceptable in to-
day's society. Its origin was the near chattel relation between husband and
wife at common law, with the wife deemed incapable of giving her consent to
sexual intercourse with another man. Id. at 277-78, 365 A-2d at 150. The court
also criticized the presumption of general damages. However, instead of con-
sidering modification of the rules, the court abolished the cause of action alto-
gether, stating that it was an anachronism because "under our new Crimes
Code, the Pennsylvania legislature has seen fit to abolish the crime of adul-
tery, serving to decriminalize the very behavior upon which an action in crim-
inal conversation rests." Id. at 280 n.7, 365 A.2d at 151 n.7. A dissenting
opinion held that the rules should be modified, and that with modification the
cause of action should be retained. Id. at 284-87, 365 A.2d at 153-55 (Roberts,
J., dissenting). Justice Roberts believed that as a result of abolition of the
crime of adultery, the civil action of criminal conversation should be retained
as the only remaining remedy for the wrong.
47. See Note, supra note 9.
46. The blurring suggested by Prosser would seem complete under the proposed
changes. See note 2 supra.
49. It has been persuasively argued by others that reform of tort law is an area
particularly ill-suited for action by legislatures, but well suited to reform by
an informed judiciary. See Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in
the Reform of Tort Law, 48 Mum'. L. REv. 265 (1963). Professor Peck did not
question the role of legislatures in law-making, but concluded that in tort re-
form legislatures generally have inherent weaknesses. These include the
general indifference of legislators to tort law-making, reluctance to involve
themselves in an issue that is irrelevant to most of their constituents, inade-
quate committee hearings and public hearings on such subjects, tendency of
legislatures to act only on bills pushed by outside interests, and nonexistence
of organized pressure groups to lobby for specific tort reforms. He suggested
that courts should always evaluate the comparative ability of a court or legis-
lature to make the proposed alteration given the context of the case before
them. Id. at 312.
Using this test it would seem that reform of the cause of action for crimi-
nal conversation should be expected to come from the judicial branch and not
the legislature, since few legislators would want to involve themselves with
the reform of an isolated cause of action involving marital infidelity, and cer-
tainly organized pressure groups are not likely to lobby for its reform or abo-
1979]
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the Nebraska Supreme Court has previously modified common law
rules governing other tort areas.50 In Brown v. City of Omaha,5 '
the court stated, "We are convinced that the rule ... is of judicial
or common law origin, and that this court has power to modify it in
the absence of legislative action to the contrary."52
Arguably the best explanation of the majority opinion's rejec-
tion of any changes is that the Kremer facts and the posture of the
litigation 53 simply were not sufficient to overcome the Nebraska
Supreme Court's predisposition toward stare decisis:
The doctrine of stare decisis is grounded on public policy and, as such,
is entitled to great weight and must be adhered to, unless the reasons
therefor have ceased to exist, are clearly erroneous, or are manifestly
wrong and mischievous or unless more harm than good will result from
doing so.
... Before overruling a former decision deliberately made, the court
should be convinced, not merely that the case was wrongly decided, but
that less injury will result from overruling than from following it.5 4
Defendant had not pointed to any statutory or decisional trends
in Nebraska which would justify the court in making any changes
in a long established tort.55 Neither had she presented any empiri-
cal data to suggest a change in public attitude toward sexually per-
missive conduct that would justify a change in the rules.5 6 The
lition. Whether the facts and posture of Kremer justified making significant
changes in the cause of action for criminal conversation is debatable. See
notes 53-57 & accompanying text infra. However, it is clear that simply saying
such reform lies with the legislature begs the question. If changes are
needed in the rules governing criminal conversation the courts are in a com-
paratively better position to make such changes than the legislature.
50. Brown v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 430, 434-35, 160 N.W.2d 805, 808 (1968) (limit-
ing governmental immunity from tort liability).
51. Id. at 430, 160 N.W.2d at 805.
52. Id. at 434, 160 N.W.2d at 808.
53. See notes 25, 38 & 41 supra.
54. Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp., 160 Neb. 279, 282-83, 70 N.W.2d 86, 88-89
(1955) (citations omitted). But see Spiker v. John Day Co., 201 Neb. 503, 512-
13, 270 N.W.2d 300, 305-07 (1978) (explicitly overruling prior case law inter-
preting permissible workmen's compensation claims). Spiker is noted in
Note, Expanding Liability Under the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation
Act, 58 NEB. L REv. 565 (1979).
55. The Nebraska situation in mid-1978, where no new criminal code was in ef-
fect, is sharply distinguishable from the situation in Fadgen, where Penn-
sylvania had statutorily abolished the crime of adultery. See note 46 supra.
56. See Ewoldt v. Yentes, Doc. 713 No. 174 (District Court of Douglas County,
Nebraska, March 3, 1977) (order overruling demurrer). A demurrer to a
cause of action for criminal conversation had been filed which asserted that
the action was unconstitutional, citing Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 365
A.2d 147 (1976). In overruling the demurrer, Judge John C. Burke com-
mented-
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majority could have buttressed its decision with recent decisions
from other jurisdictions which have shown a marked reluctance to
interfere with traditional tort areas involving interference with
family relations 5 7
B. Impact of the New Criminal Code
L Impact on Damages
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished the cause of
action for criminal conversation, one of the reasons stated was that
it was an anachronism since the Pennsylvania legislature had
abolished the crime of adultery,5 8 thus eliminating the criminal el-
ement of the tort of criminal conversation. Although the Nebraska
legislature made a complete revision of the Nebraska Criminal
Code in its 1977 session, the changes were not effective until Janu-
ary 1, 1979, and had no effect on the Kremer case. The new Crimi-
nal Code retains adultery as a crime but with a greatly narrowed
definition.5 9 Now only a married person who deserts his or her
marriage partner, actually cohabits with another person, and
under those circumstances has sexual intercourse is guilty of adul-
tery.60 Under the old law, in effect at the time of the events in
Kremer, both the spouse and the cooperating partner were guilty
of adultery, and desertion of family and cohabitation were not nec-
essary requirements. 6 1 A single act of sexual intercourse was ade-
While it may be true that today's society places greater inviolabil-
ity around a high school football player's intentions in his selection
of a university than it does around the marriage contract, yet, this
court is not aware of any "new conditions" today that were not in
existence prior to the statehood of Pennsylvania.
Ewoldt v. Yentes, slip op. at 1.
57. In a recent case involving alienation of affection, the Minnesota Supreme
Court stated. "Until the legislature declares that individuals are free to in-
trude themselves upon the special relationship which exists between a hus-
band and wife, we feel no compelling sense of urgency to do so." Gorder v.
Sims, 306 Minn. 275,282, 237 N.W.2d 67,71 (1975). The Supreme Court of Ore-
gon showed even more restraint in refusing to alter a $100,000 damage award
or abolish the cause of action for criminal conversation, considering that in
the time period between the trial court decision and review by the Supreme
Court the Oregon legislature had abolished the cause of action for criminal
conversation. Brown v. Vogt, 272 Or. 482, 538 P.2d 362 (1975). The new law
was not yet effective at the time of the court's decision.
58. Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 280-81 n.7, 365 A.2d 147, 151 n.7 (1976).
59. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-101 to -1475 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (effective Jan. 1, 1979).
60. "Any married person who deserts his or her spouse and lives, cohabits, and
engages in sexual ... [intercourse] with another person... commits adul-
tery." NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-704 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (effective Jan. 1, 1979).
61. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-902 (Reissue 1975) (repealed Jan. 1, 1979). The statute
was cumbersomely drawn, but managed to draw in any combination of mar-
ried or unmarried person, whether in isolated incidents or by desertion and
cohabitation. Both participants were guilty of adultery.
19791
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
quate for conviction for adultery62 and to sustain damages for
criminal conversation. 63
In changing the law the Nebraska legislature expressed a
change in public policy toward sexual conduct.64 Although reten-
tion of a crime of adultery indicates that the Nebraska legislature
feels that the public interest demands protection of the marriage
relationship through sanctions against adultery, the significant dif-
ference is that this interest has been much more narrowly defined.
Only a particular kind of sexual misconduct outside the marriage
relation is defined as an intrusion sufficient to warrant condemna-
tion by the state. It would seem that the narrow definition of adul-
tery in the new Criminal Code, plus the failure to include other
types of sexual activity previously classified criminal,65 supports a
conclusion that in future decisions the Nebraska Supreme Court
should narrow the scope of the cause of action for criminal conver-
sation.
Now that the crime of adultery has been redefined, isolated in-
cidents of marital infidelity, unaccompanied by desertion of family
or cohabitation with the sexual partner, should either no longer be
grounds for a judicially imposed civil remedy against the partner
or should not be the basis for an award of more than nominal dam-
ages absent a showing of intent and actual damages. This would
tend to put the civil penalties for extramarital sexual activities in
line with the criminal sanctions. However, whether or not the of-
fense of adultery has been committed should be determined with
reference to the plaintiffs spouse rather than with reference to the
defendant since, under the new Criminal Code definition, it is pos-
sible for one participant in a sexual activity to commit adultery,
but not the other. For example, in Kremer, plaintiff's husband
would have met the statutory definition since he had deserted his
spouse and cohabited with defendant, but defendant would not
have met the statutory definition since she was not married. In the
62. State v. Byrum, 60 Neb. 384, 83 N.W. 207 (1900).
63. Breiner v. Olson, 195 Neb. 120, 237 N.W.2d 118 (1975).
64. The preamble to the new Criminal Code states:
The general purposes of the provisions ... are:
(1) To forbid and prevent conduct that unjustiflably and inex-
cusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to individual or public
interests;
(8) To safeguard conduct that is without fault and which is es-
sentially victimless in its effect from condemnation as criminal;
(4) To givefair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to
constitute an offense.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-102 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (effective Jan. 1, 1979) (emphasis
added).
65. See note 69 infra.
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future, in order to state a cause of action for criminal conversation,
plaintiff should be required to establish that his or her spouse's
activities were within the statutory definition of adultery and that,
as a result, plaintiff suffered actual damages. It should not be nec-
essary for plaintiff to establish that defendant had also committed
adultery, for that would deny plaintiff recovery if defendant were
unmarried.
2. Impact on Defenses
A further consideration is the impact of the new Criminal Code
definition of adultery on the issue of whether defenses should be
allowed in an action for criminal conversation. Under the old
Code, cohabitation and sexual intercourse between unmarried
adults was a crime.66 In addition, a defendant in a suit for criminal
conversation could not raise as a defense his or her lack of knowl-
edge that plaintiff's spouse was married or had represented him-
self or herself to be unmarried.67 One possible basis for denying a
defense of lack of knowledge was that, by definition, defendant
was engaged in a criminal act, and one wrong should not be al-
lowed as a defense against another.68 Now, with certain clearly de-
fined exceptions, sexual intercourse between consenting adults,
married or unmarried, is no longer a criminal act in Nebraska.69 In
these situations, in which it is no longer a criminal act for a person
to engage in sexual relations with a person to whom he or she is
not married, lack of knowledge of the sexual partner's marital sta-
tus should now be permitted as a defense in a criminal conversa-
tion tort action. Such a defense would prevent the imposition of
66. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-928 (Reissue 1975) (repealed Jan. 1, 1979).
67. See notes 6-7 & accompanying text supra. By this feature, the tort becomes
one of strict liability once the prima facie case of a marriage and an act of
sexual intercourse is established. General damages are presumed, and the
only defenses are that plaintiff consented, or that no act of sexual intercourse
occurred.
68. Only the husband's consent worked as a defense at common law since the
wife had no legal status and was, therefore, incapable of giving consent.
Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. at 277,365 A.2d at 150. However, this narrow expla-
nation of the rule should not obscure the great moral indignation that has
always surrounded the cause of action. This factor became increasingly im-
portant as the protected interest shifted from a property right to the more
abstract concept of injury to the right of consortium. Lippman, supra, note 1,
at 655-60.
69. Criminal Code, LB. 38, § 328,1977 Neb. Laws 141, repealed all prior sections of
the Criminal Code except those reassigned to title 14 of the new Code. Under
the new Code the only situations in which consenting adult sexual activity is
made criminal are incest, adultery (as narrowly defined, see notes 60-61 & ac-
companying text supra), prostitution, publicly displayed sexual activity, or
sexual activity between a human and an animal. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 28-703,
704, 801, 806, 1003 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (effective Jan. 1, 1979).
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harsh economic penalties upon a person who participated in a sex-
ual activity that is no longer a crime, and who was not aware of his
or her partner's marital status.
Allowing the defense of lack of knowledge makes even more
sense in light of the fact that the strict liability rule evolved when
only husbands had a cause of action for criminal conversation.
The wife, having no legal status, was incompetent to make repre-
sentations about anything affecting her husband's legal rights.7 0
The shift from a husband's strict property right in his wife as a
basis for criminal conversation to the more abstract concept of
consortium71 reinforces the logic of modifying rules arising in an
earlier period.
C. A Socially Cognizable Interest
Between the extremes of the isolated sexual encounter with a
person who does not know of his or her partner's marital status
and the clearly proscribed desertion and cohabitation lies the
more difficult issue whether rules on damages and defenses should
be modified in the case of the spouse who continues his or her mar-
ital relationship while engaging in a continuing sexual relationship
with a partner who is aware of the marriage. Such activity is not
classified criminal under the new Nebraska Criminal Code. How-
ever, "[i]f ... the basis of the tort of criminal conversation is per-
ceived as the protection of conjugal rights-meaning simply the
protection of the reasonable expectations of spouses surrounding
the marital relationship-it becomes more difficult to deny the
existence of a socially cognizable interest."72 One author has
stated. "A more relevant question is whether a family member's
interest in the continued harmony of his home is of sufficient mag-
nitude to warrant judicial protection from those who would inten-
tionally interfere with it.''73 A cause of action for criminal
conversation should exist to deter extramarital relationships and
prevent knowing interference with a marriage.74 But, by permit-
70. Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. at 277, 365 A.2d at 150.
71. See notes 3-4 & accompanying text supra.
72. Note, supra note 1, at 1260.
73. Note, supra note 9, at 426 (emphasis added). The author concluded that the
interest in the "harmony of his home" did warrant judicial protection, but
through a cause of action for criminal conversation permitted only when in-
tentional interference occurred.
74. Breiner v. Olson, 195 Neb. 120,237 N.W.2d 118 (1975). See notes 33-34 & accom-
panying text supra. The potential injustice resulting from having no cause of
action for criminal conversation is shown by a case in which the plaintiff's
wife, while undergoing treatment by her psychiatrist, was persuaded to have
sexual relations. Nicholson v. Han, 12 Mich. App. 35, 162 N.W.2d 313 (1968).
The husband's complaint was dismissed on the grounds it amounted to a
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ting the raising of lack of knowledge or intent as a defense, the
cause of action would no longer have the characteristics of a strict
liability tort. This is highly desirable because it retains the cause
of action while removing the feature that can too easily lead to
harsh results. Such a change brings criminal conversation into
line with the other tort actions governing intentional interference
with the marital relationship. 75
V. CONCLUSION
In today's more sexually permissive society, many are no doubt
shocked that one party to a willing sexual encounter was sued for
$10,000 by her partner's spouse. They would argue that sexual ac-
tivity between consenting adults is their own business, and that in
this case the only person who injured the plaintiff was her hus-
band. They would, therefore, conclude that the Nebraska Supreme
Court was wrong in Kremer. Although such an argument is philo-
sophically consistent, it ignores the established law in this area. It
is an unfair condemnation of a court whose fundamental purpose
is to interpret and construe the law, not create it. Despite the in-
herent potential for abuse which has led several states to statuto-
rily abolish the cause of action, there has been no clear abuse of
criminal conversation in Nebraska such as to prompt the legisla-
ture to abolish it.76 Although the decision in Kremer may have
been justified by the facts, the court should have dealt with the
issue whether the cause of action should be modified. The impact
of the new Nebraska Criminal Code may allow the court to distin-
guish prior cases, and with the right factual situation before it, to
make significant changes in the cause of action for criminal conver-
sation in Nebraska.
Donald D. Schneider '80
charge of criminal conversation or alienation of affections, and both actions
were abolished by statute in Michigan. Id. at 43-44, 162 N.W.2d at 317. Also,
the action should continue to exist as a possible civil remedy for the family of
a rape victim. Jacobson v. Siddal, 12 Or. 280, 284-85, 7 P. 108, 110 (1885).
75. Alienation of affection and enticement have always required a showing of in-
tent and knowledge that the person was married. See note 2 supra.
76. Compare the $10,000 award in Kremer to the $100,000 in Brown v. Vogt, 272
Or. 482, 538 P.2d 362 (1975), or the $60,000 in Giltner v. Stark, 219 N.W.2d 700
(Ia. 1974). Solicitation of sexual intercourse by plaintiffs spouse did not de-
ter a New York jury from awarding $50,000 in a case which eventually went to
the United States Supreme Court when defendant tried to avoid his liability
through a declaration of bankruptcy. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904).
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